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HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL
REDUCTION REVISITED:
AN ATTEMPT OF A RENEWED ACCOUNT
SEBASTIAN LUFf

This essay ulternp" a renewed. critical expo')ilion of Husserl's
theory of the phenomenological reduction. incorporating
nlllnU'o.crip' material that h:h been publi~hed r.;ince the defining
essays of the first gencrullon of Husser! research . The discussion
focuses on poinl~ lhal remain especially crucial. i. c. the concept
of the nalUral attitude. the ways into the reduction. and
the qucMion of the "meaning of the reduction". The reading
attempted here le:lds to two, nOI nece~,arily related, f()(.'al points:
a Cartesian and a Lifc·world tendency. In fo ll owing thtsc two
paths. Husser! was con,btcnl in pursuing two evident lead!<l in his
philosophical enterprise: however, he wns at lhe same Lime unable
to systematically unify these two strand ..... Thu!t. I am offering an
inlcrpretation which might be called a modified "departure from
Carte!tianism" reading that Landgrebe propo~cd in hb famou!<essay from the nineteell·firtie ... (3 reading thnl is still valid in many
contempomry c.:Xposilion ... of Husserl's thought) . This discussion
should make :tpparcnt thai Husserl' s theory of the phenomenological reduction dcscrvt!"i a renewed look in lighl of malcriul
Ihal ha ... since appeared in the Husser/ianG and by incorporaling
the mOM importanl re . . ull~ of recent tendencies in HUII!'>erl research

INTRODUCTION

An a uthor a llempti ng an accou nt o f Husserl' s me thod o f the
p he no me nologica l red uc tion finds h imself in a n un grati fied
position. This theme is one of the main topics in what is now more
Ihan six ty years of Husserl researc h I. Furt hermore. th is the me has
I. Whereas the first generation of Husser! research (E. Fink. R. Boehm.
L. Landgrebe. I. Kern) dealt extensive ly with Ihe problem of the reduction, Ialcly.
All/lorio Filoj'ojico. XXXVIIII (2004),65-104
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been so dominant in Husser!'s self-interpretation that talking about
it equals discussing Husser!'s late phenomenology as a whole.
However. a general account of what Hu"erl "really intended" with
his phenomenology risks being sllperficial by concluding with a
generality every traditional

philo~opher

would claim as her or his

final telos: to express the truth about the world. Yel. were it true
that "all great philosophers think the self-same", we would. on the
one hand, end up in trivialities regarding philosophical endeavors
as such; on the other hand. we would miss precisely the point
which was so important to Husserl , that is precisely the IIniqueness
of his philosophical method, which di"inguished him from his
predecessors rather than what he had in common with them. This
notwithstanding that it was one of his late realizations that he could
not simply do away with the tradition of which. hc realiLed. he
himself was a parI.
Whilc Husscrl' s se lf-charucteriLations especially in his last
work. "rhe Crisis of Enropean Sciences", seems to put off
many readers due to their ceremonious formulations, instead of
approaching Hw.serl from the outside, an approach " from the
bOllom up" will be more fruitful than a presentation from the
perspective of his late posi tion , when he already was "certain of the
future"2 While this may well have bcen the case for Husserl, he
neve rtheless in sisted that the reduction as the method to enter
phenomenology is not a device that , once performed. is valid for
all times. It does nOI entail that the one who has been "converted"]
would remain so for the rest or his or her lire. Rather. the reduction
must be practiced repeatedly; the gremest threat for Ihc philosopher
being to "fallout" of the mindset of the philosophical attitude. This
threa t is, however. integral to the performance of the reduction.
If the reduction is the only way into phenomenology as transeen-

c... pccially in the French phcnonlt:l1ologic:al ...cellc. the reduction ha ... again been

u dominnnt theme. cfr. the
2.

work~

err. " Ocr Zu!"unft bin

by M. Ilc.:nry nnd l -L. Marion.

ieh 'Icher", In a leiter 10 hi ... friend G . Albrecht. Ill :

Brh111't'c/m!l9. PI'. 75 f. (from Decemher 29. 1(30).
3. The metaphor 01 a rdigiou, comcr... ion
Crisis. err. Kr;s;,\. p. 140: after Cr;Y;" p. l.t I.
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dental philosophy then it mu st be part of this theory to furnish an
en trance in a "didactic" fashio n.
Every philosophical theory is an a nswer to a problem on the
basis of which the theory receives its mean ing. and this also goes
for the reduction. The first piece of theory to lead to the reduction
is the concept of epoche. This method was intended in the Skeptic
tradition to gain an unbiased view away from the mi sguided

theories of the past. Thus. the figure of bracketing is more than just
terminologically derived fro m th e Skeptics and comes out of a
well-established philosophical problem . To thi s. Husserl I/olells
I'olens contributes. Thus. a lthough his framing of the reduction is
only understandable on the basis of hi s mature transce ndental
philosophy, th e problem emerges from a ce rtai n philosophical
context he did nOl create.
Thus. first we have to explicate the philosophical co ntex t to
a ce rt a in extent, if only to show that Hu sserl dist<1nces himself
from it. Hu sserl aHempt' to suspe nd traditional misconceptions
in an effon to so lve the fundamental philosophical problem
of establi shing "true and last ing knowledge". Nevertheless. he acknowledges the problem underlying hi s phil osophica l com mencement. If this problem is the "sta ning point" for hi s project. it is
eq ua l 10 that of finding the true "eIllnmce gate" to philosophy. This
starti ng point is IIlready a problem. that of how to begin with
philosophy. This prc>uppo,es that the act of philo,ophy is
some thing peculiar co mpared 10 the "no rmal " execu ti on of life.
This issue. underpinning hi s philo;ophical enterpri,e. can
be termed the epistemological problem . From here , Hu sse rl 's
philosophical developme nt moves from a descriptive phenomenologica l psychology to a systema ti c univer~al "sc ience" in a
transcendental regi~ter. As such. the problem of en tering this

emergent science is not a ladder to be thrown away o nce c limbed.
Rather, " the problem of entry" is part of the phenomenological
method itself.
Avoidance of a lapsing back into an immanent reconM rllct ion of

Husserl 's theory of the reduction necessitates a preliminary sketch
of the epistemological problem which led Hu sserl to perform the
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transcende nta l redu c tio n. T he e pi ste mo logical fra ming o f the
proble m o r intrOducing phe nome no logy will lead to an ex plication
o f the fund a me ntal fo rm o f life, the "natu ral alt itude". It will
become apparent thai it is not onl y a problem of leavill g this life
form in order to make one's way into phe nome no logy. It is in itself
a pro blem o f Lhe mati zing thi s " pri ma l" altitude, and in do ing so
o ne is alread y pe rforming the first ste p of the reduct ion. Fro m
there, I shall di scuss the different ways into pheno meno logy. While
th e e poc he deal. with overco ming th e na tural a ttitud e, th e
me thodica l probl e ms o f makin g a concre te way into the tra nscendental " realm" onl y begin . One can di scern Ihree majo r ways
into phenomenology and show a ce rt ai n sys temati cs in th eir

unfo lding . In the thi rd pa rt , I w ill di scuss the meaning the
reduction has for Hus;e r!. It has essenti ally two consequences that
stand pa radi g matica ll y as the mea ning Hu sserl a ttributes to
transcende ntal phenomeno logy. However, I want to assert criticall y
th at in these two di rec tio ns Husserl has failed to show the ir
syste mati c connecti o n. Ultima tely. we are left with two " loose
ends" whi ch Hu. serl was n' t a bl e to ti e togethe r. perh aps because
this is ultimately impossible.

I . TH E EPIST EMOLOGICA L PRO BLEM: T I-IE R ELATIVITY OF
TR UTHS AND T HE OVERCOM ING OFTHE NATU RA L ATrtTUDE

The epistemologica l proble m concerns true know ledge, a nd the
means of attaining it. This issue comes aboul precisely where it is
noticed as a proble m. Hence, one might as k, is know ledge eo ipso
tru e know ledge? Th is de pe nds no t o nl y on the mean ing of
knowl edge, but also on the contex t in which one e mploys knowledge. The sc iences represent one such fi eld. The ac hieveme nt and
pursuit of true knowledge is vital to sc ientific prac tice and to the
meaning of scie nce. Whethe r o ne speaks of absol ute truths (i.e .. in
mathe mati cs or logic), or adequati on to truth (e.g .. in meteorology,
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where truths can o nl y be approximate) the value of a scie nce
de pends upo n its reaching true knowledge.
The sc ie nces. however. are not the onl y fi e ld in which knowledge is an issue. In opposi tion to the sciences. there is the "field"
of pre-scientific life. The o rdinary pe rformance o f life is carri ed
o ut in the life-H ·orld. Wherea" the problem of "absolutel y true"
know ledge seldom becomes a theme he re, the question of truth is
more crucial than one at first imagines. Picture e.g" the occurrence
o f a car accide nt. Imag ine then the different "true stories" heard
fro m different people involved: the drivers, a passer-by on the
sidewa lk , etc. Especially when some intere"t is at stake (w ho
assumes the blame for the acc ident ) one will hear entirely different
"versions". all claimi ng the ·'truth". Husserl call s these "situational
truths" and it is the task of a judge to ''j udge the truth" which might
lie, a" one te nds to impl y. "i n the middl e." Obviously neither the
notion o f truth nor of know ledge are take n e mphaticall y (thus.
absolutely). The task of the judge entail s the "distillation" of " the"
truth from different ;tories. The result is onl y an approximation to
what "reall y happened", attempting to satisfy both panies. Truth in
this sense is an ·'idea".
In thi s exam pl e. "truth" is an issue o r rhe to ric serving certain
interests -a nd maybe even of ideology. There is no "absolute
truth " about the event o f the car accident. although multip le
persons claim to ha ve "true knowledge." despite contradicting each
othe r. While here the j ustification for truths is de batable. the re are
other areas wherein we do talk o f truth and true know ledge yet in
an unemphatic manner. For exampl e. in the market place on a
certain day one spea k' o f the "tru e" price o f produce without
referring to the "abso lute price". The ve ndors fix the price anew
each day. It will be determined by different circumstances. Hence.
the dail y price o f a fruit is its situational "truth" and. as such. it is
debatable: one ba rgains over the indi vidual price every da y. Thi s
no ti on of " truth" is re lati ve to the situation . evertheless. thi s
" truth" will have its "authority" and " rig idity" that is far off from
mathematical ri gor. Likewise, knowledge of this truth is fashioned
in a similar way. One ca lb the pe rson ex perie nced in empl oyi ng
69
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these ~itllalional truth.., a good salc!o.pcrson or a good bargainer.
Hu,serl also u,ed Ihe e\ample of the house to illU'irale that a
single object can yield differing opinions without invalidating
other~. What one perceives depends on who one is:

(I

real eM~IIC

agent views the hou..,c as an object for !'<alc. an anist as a piece of
arl. etc. Within each perspective. the,e "inlerpretation," claim
..,ilUalional truths. However. none of thc"c person~ see.., their views
(IS

an interpretation.

TilliS, in order for a siluational !nuh 10 he a Inllh. it must block
out other contradicting truths. The truth of the ani,t is different
from that of the real e<,[ate agent. Howe\ cr. they ha\ e their own
·'right." bccau;.,c they do not stand in competilio" with one another.
But why not. if there is contradiction between them " The an,,'er
lies in the notion of interest. What "COIlMilules" a cenain situation

as such. what mark, it as relatiye

10

other situations. i, that the

pursuit of a certain intcrC\1 circulll''1cribc.., a situation and "con-

stitute," a self-enclosed domain. The illlerest determines the truth
of the ,itualion. The interest of the real eslate agenl in selling the
house determine, hi, situational truth. The arlbt. likewise. pUf>ues
her own interest.
Life in general i, hence a "life of interest". In thi, sel"e. life
enlail~ LI Illultiplicity or intcrc:,ts. each creating a ~pecific situation.
However. we musl not undeNand the situational "field" of an
interest as exactly delineated. Rather, il has the character of an
hori/on which can expand and narrow. yet never come~ La an end.
Applying this structure to the situalions, we can say that the field

of an illlerest does nO! end in that there is no principle limit to that
which can rail in the field or interest. At the same time. these
"field'" are ,elr-enclo,cd due to the operative interest. Situations
arc not i!-.Iand~ in H sea. Rather. they arc horizon~ extending over a

limiled stretch or field of being. As such, they arc essentially
limited (greek "orf~eill). In Ihis sen,e. they also exclude each other.
The metaphor or tinted eyeglasses best illustrates the manner in
Wllich ,itu3Iion, differ and e,clude each mher. Seeing through red
glasses make, green objects in\'i,ible. "herea, they will become
vi,ible when seen with glasses of another color. This can be
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co mpared lO Ihe fac i Ihal a silUalional allilUde blocks OUl Olher
siluHti on:-" M ore over. th e image see n currentl y remains the ~a l11 e

despile dilTcrenl colori ngs of Ihe glasses. The objeci is in each case
Ihe same ; il is "raw bell1g" or "hylelic slOck." in Husserl 's words.
In Ihe nalUral alliwde. however, we can never see Ihi s objeci in ilS
purily .
Perceplion of such purity would involve stripping the world of
its interest. Yet, due to its illlen ti onal character, life always
implements a ce rtain interest. There is no un-intenti onal life. and
intelllionalilY always strhes toward fulfillm enr . The world has
thu s a "face of interesl" (/Itleressellges iclu) Ihal it always turn~ LO
us in one way or anolher. Since il is e"enti all y a world of interests.
one can g ive another notion to charac teri!e the world. If the
execuLion of life occ urs in a multiwde of si tuati ons. Lhen life
becomes the siwation of all , iluations. or the horizon of all
hori l.ons5. If this b (0 be morc than a meldlwsis eis allo geno.\'. it
mu-,l have a concrete meaning. H ow doc:, one conce i ve of a

hori70n of all hori/ons'?
Husserl aims at a notion of the life-world lhat caplU res the
totality of life in it> multilUdinous facets . The life-world is the field
in which life carries itself out; it is normal life in ils everydayness.
Whether Hu sserl ca ll s lhi s co mpl ex phenomenon life-world or
"nalural world-life", he alternalely cmph"si/es either the noematic
(the world) or the noetic (the li ving) aspect. The noelic-noema ti c

4.
Thl .. neglect3 th~ pmblcm~ ll f pU3"ivity nnd ~clf-affcc ti\'it y. Bccau,c the
con<.:eptulIl of lift' i.. COil "ide red here from the fJC"pcctivc of the natural atti tude.
the top ic.. of p,h~i\' it ) and ,,,::If-a ffec tivity arc not gernwnc to thi s di3CU~!\iol1. For
II n::L.:on'ltruc tion of thi" p~I". . tVC. prc -~Ifft!cti vc life. cfr. D . ZMIAVt. 'The Fracture
In Sc1f-Aw:lrcne ...... ". in: 7AII·WI. cd.. Self-ClI\"{/rnll'~\. Tt'lIIfJoralim (lIId AIIl!nt"DordrcchtlBo... toniLondon 1998 (Contribution .. to Pheno menology 3-1-). 21--tO. a...
,""ell a.. : R. Kl"Ht-.. IIt1Herl~ Begri{( tier Pm.H1'iliil. ZUI' Kri l1 4 der pauil'l'Ij
SWfliesn 11/ dt,,, GelU'II.\(·/ten Phllllomenololfle. Frelburg/Munu:h 1998 (Phiinomcnologlc. Texlc lind KOl1le\.h! 6)
5.
Crr. Hua XV. TC\l 14. pp. 196-218 (+ appendIX X I). cfr. 310;0 the c.:rillcal
interpretation by Hut). K.: " ~h::. im\\clt. Fremdwc lt. die clIle Welt". in: Phtino111cno1ogt'chc FOI'<.;chullgcll 24/25 ( 199 1). pp , 305-.'\37.
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struclUre designates the correlational a priori in its universal forrn 6
It signifi es the essenti al relatedness of world and conscious life.
The correlate to the life-world is the mode of living in which this
life-world is the horizon for any kind of action: as such. the
correlale 10 the life-world is the "natural atlitude"7.
In allempting to enter the sphere of philosophy and to assume a
philosophical point of view. one has to relinqui sh Ihe natural
altitude. However. it is not clear why Ihis would be necessary. Are
there compelling reasons for "overcoming" natural life by the
philosopher? Furthermore. what do nalUral and philol>ophical
designate here? Husserl intends an adaptation of the ancient
distinction between d6xa and epis/hlleS. However. he assigns a
specific "modern" interpretation to it. loca lized on a higher level
than that of "mere" pre-philosophical naivete. opposed to "mere"
crilical reasoning9.
Hu sserl conceives of the nalUral in opposition to Ihe philosophical attitude. This opposition echoes the di stinction between
pre-transcendental and transcendental landpoints as the modern
version of the d6xa-epis/ellle di . tinction . The transcendental lurn
anticipated by Descartes. and taken by Kant. occurs via the
realization of the subject-relativity of Ihe world. Further, the lUrn
to the subject. the "reduction" to the ego (cagita) bccomes the
foundation supporting the edifice of science. The world is not an
"absolute being" but is relative to the experiencing subject. All

6.

efr. Kri.\ ;,'i,

*46. pp.

161 f.. and ibid .. pp. 169 f., footnote; Cr;.\';s.

pp. 159 f.. ibid.. 166 r.. rootnote.

7.
efr. Hu sse rl '~ first account of the ntltuml altitude in Ideas I. §§ 27 ff .. as
well as his laler. morc elaborate analyses in the munulicript material. publl~hcd in
!-Iua XV. 3!'t well a~ in the Crisis. §§ 34-37,
8.
rr. KriJiJ. § 44. pp. 158 r.: Crisis. pp. 155 rr.
9.
Whereas Hu s ... crl employs d(ixlI and ep'Sfet"e to characterile the
fundamental nature of thi .. distinclion - and hence the radically new nature of

phenomcnology- . he ~pcaks of "Neusliftungen" over against the ori ginal primal
inMiluting~ in early Greek thought: efr. Hila XX IX. Text no, 32, pp. 362-420.
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experience is worldly. bUI world is alway, an experienced world lo
Thus, Husserl illlerprcis Descartes' turn to the subject and Kant 's
tran scendental philo so phy as rudimentary forms of his
tran sce ndental turn that anticipated hi, co nception of a
correlational apriorjll. The realization of the essem ial subjeclrelatedness of all worldline>s necessitate, this transcendental turn.
Why is this transcendental turn idemical with lea>i ng the natural altitude ? The natural altitude knows nothing of this
corre lation al apriori. The distinction between world and natu re
illustrates the meaning of the "'naivele" of the natural altilude.
Because the natural altitude knows ncither of thi s subjec trelatedness nor of its life a.. guided by a certain illlerest, it lives in
the belief it can percei ve the world as Iiali/re . As previously shown.
however. Ihis is impossible within the natural attitude. It implies
Ihe illusion of seeing Ihe world stripped of any imerest, whereas
any situati on within the natural attitude is governed by "interest",
However. this is not to say th at it is impossible to gain an
"unilllerested" view. Quite to the cOlllrary. the recognition that all
situation, in the natural atti lude are guided by subjective illlerests
is already the essemial step beyond the natural attitude. Yet. the
elemellls that moti vate the turn to the subject are already prese lll in
the natural attitude.
Understanding the subject-relatedness of all experience leads to
the overcoming of the natural altitude. which is immersed in the
horizon of special interests. Thus, the epistemo logical problem
consists in being blind to the correlativity of world and experience.
The distinction of d6xa and episleme "translated" into the modern
situation of philosophy means : Philosophy which believes it can
1O. J-I owc\cr. HU ~'icr l lIu,i,!.., that (hi !. vcr.;ion of lran \ce ndcntal philo:iophy i ~
nOI an idcali~m in the form of. c.g.. Berkcky (Kruis. pp. 88 r.: Crisis. pp. 86 1".).
which denies lhe ex, ... tencc of the ex ternal world.
11. He also commend ... the Briti sh Emplricilil!oo in their development of
n I,cientlfic psychology . H O\~evcr. a~ for the development of a lran,cendentul
philo~ophy the decisive figure ... of modern phllo~ophy are the one~ mentioned
l.lbovc. efr. the schema Cairn ... draws up aflcr a cOlwcr ... ,uion with Husserl. In :
D . CAIRNS. COII\'ersations with /-Ius\er/ lind Fil/k. Den Haa g. 1976 (plutcno·

menoiogic;] 66). p. 1().t ,
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operate on a "reali stic" level i, bound to the nawral alliwde. As
such. it ca nnot claim to be critical in the Kantian sense. Thi s is not
onl y Husser! '; critique o f pre- transce ndental phil oso phy. It is
e.peciaIl y hi s critique of hi s pupil s who neglected to pursue the
transcendental path that Husserl had taken up with Ideas I ( 19 I3).
Thi s framin g of the epistemologica l probl em motivates the way
into phenomenology. whi ch is identica l with rea li l ing the limits of
the natural altitude. As such. phenomenology for Hu sser! is necessaril y tran sce ndelll al phil osophy, which ent a il . adhering to the
subject-relatedness of all ex perience.

2. THE PERFORM ANCE OFTHE REDUCTION:
TH E MAlI>: PAT HS INTO THE REDUCTI ON

Husser! conceived several ways illlo the reducti on. The number
of th es e w ays has been subj ect to debat e.

or grea ter

importan ce.

howeve r. i, Hu sser! 's be lie f in the systemat ic order of th e
Within thi s sys te m ~ll ics . none or th ese ways devaluate.
rather. they expli cate. Clarify and co mpliment each olher. Hence.
the reconstruclion I propose aHempts to adhere to the systematic
order HlI s~erl envisioned while di sregarding th e temporal ord er in
which he di scovered them. Legi timi Lation of thi s di sregard owes to
Husserl 's asserti on th.H lhe Cart es ian way rC lai n ~ its '"right" and
"validit y"12 despite the probl em, Husser! sees wi th it.

reducLi ons.

a)

The Cartesia n Way

If the reducti on. in leaving the natural alliwde. is not an
imposs ible endeavo r, then there must be ce rtain "proto- forms" of
pUlling the normal pursuit of life out of acti on within this prim ary
11.
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"'lat(: of life.

Hu~~cr1

u... e... a ~implc example or ... uch a proto-form :

lhe suspension of judgmenl lWO people will praclice whcn in
discordance wilh one anal her. If bOlh arc unsure of lhe lrUlh of
lheir judgmcnl', lhey will suspend il. unlil lhey have found OUI lhe
lrulh L1. On ly when one a'Scrts lhc lrulh of lhe judgmenl hilherto
uncerlain, will il again be PUI inlO aClion, In lhe lime belween
doubl and confirmalion lhe judgmem ("il is so") is "brackeled".
When Hu"erl labels lhis brackeling epochI', il shall suffice 10
remind lhal he lakes il over from Ihe Skeplic lradilion l4 . In a
similar sense, Descane>, melhod in his Meliilllliolls i, likewisc 10
be understood as an epoch': in so far as Ihc decision 10 "once in his
life" overthrow all knowledge i, equall) a radical "'lep back" from
everyday life. The queslions of how and why lhe Canesian Epoche
is Ihe firsl way Hu"erl uscs 10 imroduce lhe rcduclion is of great
importance. When he Imer IISCS lhe lerm "reduclion" for lhis
melhod as a whole, he see ms 10 want 10 idenlify bmh slCPS of
epoche and rcduclion. This blu" certain nuance, lhal one mighl
want 10 rewin bel ween lhem for Ihe sakc of clarifying the delails of
lhis mClhod . In addilion, il is only from his Imcr undeNanding of
lranscendental ,ubjeclh ily Ihal lhe reduclion can becomc more
dominanl in lhc de\elopmCnl of lhis melhod. How docs lhe Epoch"
comc aboul?
The nalUral allilude consisb in viewing lhc world as "nalure,"
hcnee as exisling independenl of an experiencing agent. II believes
lhal lhe world esis" whelher il is experienced or not. Thi s belief

11 err. CAIRl\\. dr. footnnt~ 19. pp. 11 f.. where thl" eX~ll1lrlc 1\ m~nlioned.
1-4. efr. III Lt>. "lIu..,<.,crl-. Rudgang aul dn ... plwillli/ll('tIOlI uml ule
~c ...chichl lichc Stcllung der Phill1ol1lcl1ologic'·. 10: PhiU/olllcllolognc/u' FonduUlx
10 (1980), 89-145. -l\kncn ... hal., exami ned Hu, ... crr .. relallon to the Skeptic
tradition and ha.., argued thai IIll'.... crl take ... a po ... ilion between ... J...cpllci"m
(or t:ritici .. ml on the one hand and l.I tendency 10 ullimate roundationali"1l1 on the
other. At the ... ame IIIne. Merlen ...... hO\\ ... that Hu ...."crl ha ... a very limited vicw of
the hi ... toric ... cumg .1\ \\ell ,:,,",cmi.luc pOIcmil.l1 of SJ...cptici\m. efr. K. MERTE\;S.
briu-ht'll U-'I:'liJl'gnifllJIIIIg lIIIlI Ski'/I\;,\. Krili\cht' Umenudlllllge/l ::'11111 5,,11I.\/I'er·
,\flillt/Il;' tier IratH:l'lIdI'111alet/ PhiilIOIIIPIW!Ogll' Edmul/d HU\\l' r/\, Frclburgl

Munich. 1996 (Orlm Phaennmcnolngicu,", VI/I), c!-.p. pp. 66- 1-l2.

75

SEBASTIAN !.lIT

Husser! calls the general Ihesis of the natural attitude l5 . This
" belief' is describable as a constant anonymous "yes-saying." It is
comparable to a constalll sound which the ear blocks out. In
HusserI' words: " It is. after all. something that lasts cOlllinuously
throughout the whole duration of the Inatural] attitude. i.e ..
throughout natural waking life"16 Thus. the epoche as pUlling the
general thesis out of action. can be ,een as making explicit this
constant base line "below" the " natural" hearing level. As such. the
epoche docs in no way devaluate or negate it. but rather puts it out
of action momentarily in order to pay attention to that which
remains unbracketed .
In Ideas I. Husserl insists that this bracketing is a malter of our
perfect freedom. i.e .. the freedom to inhibit what we want to and to
the extent we walll to do SOl7 He later considered both elements
("how" and " to what extelll"j of thi, "freedom" as problematic.
First. where does this freedom come from? If the natural altitude is
this self-enclosed field of everyday life. then why should. and how
cOl/ld it be left by bracketing it? Secondly. even discussing the
possible exten l of the validity of the general Ihesis gives rise to an
understanding of it as a field with a greater or smaller scope
- ultimately that the field of the general thesis is like a continent
within an oce'ln. The very fact of disclIssing a larger or greater

scope misconstrues the radicality of the epoche. which supposedly
"with one stroke" puts the general thesi s out of action.
The General Thesis of the natural allitude pervades every form
of life. since all life is guided by a certain interesl and hence
affirms being. PUlling this life-pulse of continuous asserting Ollt of
action can only occur as totalizing act. There is either being ill or
Ol/l of action. However, whereas thi s radicality in fact calls for an
equa ll y radical motivation. this rigid "eilher or" neglects the
character of Ihe "yes" of the general thesis and the possibility of
15. err. idt't!1I I. § )0, p. 52: Ideal I, p. 56. err. al ~o Hua VIII. PI'. 4+50.
where Hu ~serl formulale, the "contcn!" of the GCIlt!rai Thc!tis a~ "the world i... ··
("Die Well i.H.").

16. Ideell t. § )0. p. 53: arter Ideas t. p. 57.
17. Idee" I. p. 54: Idea,\ 1. p. 58.
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"breaking its spell" . It is a "yes" wilh rcspeCI 10 the character of Ihe
world taken to be "existing", but this world is to be understood as
always existing in a manifold of ways. This refers to the multitude
of special world s as being li ved through in the natural alt itude.
How can it at all be possible to bracket all these modes of living
with one single stroke?
Apan from Hu sserl's insistence that it is a mailer of our perfect
freedom . a motivation for this step lies precisely in the relati vi ti es
of the situationa l truths. If all of these are mcre ly truths for
themselves and if the philosopher's aim is to rcach "absolute"
truth. then it wi ll seem plausible 10 refrain from asserting any of
Lhis. This very rea lization can already be seen as brackeLing. since
understanding these relativities as relativities already overcomes
being immersed in Lhem. The si Luat ional truths can onl y consider
themselves as Lruths if Lhey Lake Lhemselves to be ab olutely Lrue,
where in facL, Lhey are only relalive. The relativity is determined by
not knowing about their silllati ona l charac ters; only because they
do not know this, they take themselves as "abso lute". Not bei ng
bound LO the situaLions means already havi ng lefL Lheir realm. In
thi s sense, leaving these situaLions behind and pUlling the va lidity
of situati onal truths out of action are the same.
The metaphor of the brackeL is yet more complex, involving
two sides: Lhat within the bracket and that WiLhout. Following Lhe
example of a doubLful judgment one does not consent to: Lhe
judgment wi ll on l y be put back into action when one has
"ev idence" about ils trllth . YeL, the brackeLs can on ly be removed
by an I which lUIS evidence and hence assert s (or modifies) the old
j udgment. The meLhod of brackeLing necessarily reverls to the Ego,
which is the executor of any aCL directed aL the world. Thlls. the
"lIIethodic expediel/t"'" Husserl takes over from Descartes -w ho
carried it OUL "for an en tirely different purpose" 19- does not have

Itll!e" I . 54: after Idem I, p. SR.
Ibid. tn facL. Hu sser! poinll<l OU I. that Descartes ()vcrcmpha~izes an
element of thi s doubt wh ich i~ not only contrary 10 Hu sse rl' ~ Ihru ~t but b
also ulLimalcly a mislead endeavor: "In De,carles. lhi !. part Isc. of doubting as
18.

19.
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the function of nullifying or negating the general thc!-'is. but rather

or motivating the turn to the subject which is the origin of the "cts
direc ted "t the world,
This is Hu s~cf'J's main inlerel",t in the proCC~\ of brnckcting : the

brackets arc set in order to determine "hat can be left "without",
The universal doubt leaves over the doubting agent. hence a pure
Ego stripped or any worldly meaning, and it is only thi s Ego that
ca n claim for itself absolute evidence, What is left over in radical
doubt is the transcende ntal ego, Thi, consciousness is the totality
of the field of intentionality, whi ch is the correlate to the world
given in inte nti onal "cts , As such, this subject can not be a psychic
enti ty in the world as my "spiritualit y", but consciousne" as such,
In thi , ,ense, brac keting the totality of the world nece"arily entails
brac keting my ego as part of the world, What is left over is not. as
Husserl self-c riti cally puts it in the Cartesia" Medillllill" ,1 from
193 1. a "/(Ig-e"d oj Ihe ,,'o r/(r 20 • the mundane ego practicing the
Epoche, Rmhcr, the epoche reveals the pure ego. consciousne" as
such. standing opposed to the world. which I '" human being have
acccl",\ to by reflection . In ord er to churacteriLC lhi'J curious

"dua lity" or egos and to diqinguish them more clearl) , Hu sserl
introduces the doctrine of the splitting of the ego, which I shall
discuss in the following section,
The strong emphasis on the ego as the expedient of epoche
indicmes that there might be several motivations to practice the
r~duction , The strongest one Husserl w~cs up from this Cartesian
impetus is that of finding a basis from which to found apodictic
evidence in the ,elf-evidence of the ego, However. it is not yet
clear how one is

(0

rc~c h

,t

new scicnlilic di ...cipline from this b(l~b

"out,ide the world", In fact. is not thi s claim of a non -worldly
subjectivi ty a metaphy,ical construction, does not thi s very ste p or
reverting to

,111

ab ~o lllt c ego lapse back into a Platoni~lTl?ll Ilu ~se rl

negatlflgl i" \u predummant Ih<.ll Olle- C~1n
j,

proper!} an
lO.

::lU~mpt

to

IlCJPIIt:

.... t) that hi . . allcmp' to doubt uni\'cr,ally
uOIH .....i.III)·· (It/C('fl I. p. 57, aher Idem I. p. SK1.

Carlt!~ialll\('''t.' MetillmiOlf('II. p.

63: after C,,"'('\/llfl M edllllllwu, p. 2....

21. Th. , ·· ,dc:.lli'lic· · or ··p luwni\tic·· IIllcrpn.:lalioll W<I' quite pnpUl:lf in Ihl.!
n::u.:llon of lIu"crr .. C~ lIl[ cll1(lo rari c ... alkr the publlc,II10n of Ide(l,', For "Iud
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never gave lip Ihe claim of having laid Lhe fOllndalion of phenomenology on this Cartesian basis . Yel. il is difficult explaining how a
philosophical sc ience could be "denved" from this absolule Ego. In
order 10 show Ihis. Hu sserl's laler self-in lerpre lali on of Ihe
Canesian wa) inlended LO show that Ihis way is merely one poinl
of access among oLhers. Ultimale ly, however, Ihey all poinl back 10
Ihis firsl path into Lhe Iranscendental sphere.
Viewing Husser!' , philosophical developmenl after Ideas I. we
ca n say Ihat the Cartesian way remained dominal1l before he felt
forced 10 broaden Ihis approach. As we shall sec in Ihe following
,eclion. his insights il1lo Ihe sphere of Iram,cendenla] consciousne"
made il necessary 10 mOdify his way inlo Ihe reduction . However.
Ihis modification was in no wayan abandoning but ralher the
extension of Ihis firsl way.

b)

The P.I,I'chofogicaf Wi/I'

The Ca n e>ian way was inLroduced 10 secure a field of apudiclic
evidence, and, as such. to create a foundalion on which apodiclic
~nowledge could be buill. Up uillil Cartesiall MediulIio17S (1931),

Hu"crl emp loys Descartes' image of Ihe tree of knowledge, whose
branches arc Ihe posilive sciences and whose Irunk is Ihe unifying
scienria 1/1I;" ersafis. Phenomenology purporl' to be Ihi, unifying
science. In Ihis approach. "Cane, iani ,m" mean, that only ev idence
of egoic experience can give Ihe ego "podicric evidence, where,,,
experience of worldly el1lilie, i, doublful, deceiving, elc. Mundane
experience can undergo moda li Lations. In other words, Ihe epoche
as a turn away from Ihe world 10 tile realm of pure consciou,ne"
was con,idered by Hus,erl in I deas I a" a move from transa reading (:fr. c.g .. NalOrp', rc\<icw of 11/('(1\ frul1l 19 17/ 1M. publi..,llcd in Logo,\
(reprint ed in : H . NOACK, cd.. I-/I/ \H'r/, Dann ... t:tdt. 1973. pp. J6-60), or more
"'Ifong ly CH'n Hcideg.gcr in hl ~ Marburg it.:clUn.' COllr-.. C from 1925126.
efr. M III IDHi(iI R. Logik . Oi l' Fra .S!,(' IlCU II t!t'r W tll/rlU!If (GA 211 . cd. b} .
W. Biemd. Fr.IIll..fun 1976. pp. 3 1- 125.
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cendence 10 pure immanence22 The argumenl for thi . turn to
"inwardness". as a bm,is for apodictic knowledge is the following.
obody doubts the evidence of something given directly, in
intuition. An external thing. a sensuous object, give" itself as itself,
and is 10 be taken as such . The principle of all principles -to ''lake
everything Ihat gives iu,elf in inLUition originarily [ ... J as what it
gives itse lf. bUI only within the boundaries in which it gives
itselr'2J- is stated preci,cly 10 support this claim. However.
looked al closely, whal is seen of a perceptual object is merely ils
front side facing me. The back side will always be hidden; as I lurn
the object around to see it, back side. its from side will again be
hidden. etc. An external object always gives itself in adumbrations
and therefore the evidence of this object will never be absolute. To
be precise: the manifest ,ide gives itself with apo<iictic evidence, in
direct perception there can be no doubt about it. However, other
unseen sides can alway, turn out to be different than anticipated. I
will never see the totality of an external thing. the evidence
regarding it will always be presumptive. Hence. evidence aboul
transcendent objects will not be apodictic, only presumptive. Since
we are searching for an absolllle. apodictic foundation. the external
experience of transcendem objects docs not qualify. Immanent
experience on the other hand docs not adumbrate it,elf. It is given
apodictically alld adequately -or, there is no difference between
bOlh forms of evidence. Only inner expcrience can be the basi, for
apodictic knowledge, since there b no uncertainty regarding its
evidence. "A /II ell /al process is 110/ adl//Ilbra/ed. 1... 1 Rather is it
evident 1... 1 from the essence of cogitationes, from the essence of
mental processes of any kind. that they exclude anything like that
Isc. adumbrationsj'"24
To be sure. there is no backside to the anger I feel (or the joy I
have etc.). If inner experiences do not adumbrate themselve , this
means that they cannot have a spatial extension. While the external
22. In thi ... he i... consi..,tcnt wi th the fir ... 1 prc\entation of the reduction in the
1907 lec lUre... on the Idea of Phenomenology: err. H/UlII. pp. 4 r.

..w f.
I. p. 77: afler Itll'lIS I. p. 90.

23 . /deen I. 51: after Idl!(H; I, pp .
24
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object I can only imagine seeing from its front side with it s back
side unseen, the imagination itselr will be given direc tl y and
absolutcly. In other wo rds, the lack of spatiality rega rding inner
ex pcriences seems to be the crite rion ror a lack or adumbrating.
Whereas adumbrations are linked to spatiality. it will sound trivial
to say that expe rie nce takes pl ace in time. Fo llow ing Husserl's
anal yses o f lime consciousness one can say (hat the time "or" these
expe ri e nces is not ex te rn al. natural time, but the time "o f ' the
ex periences themselves. Experiences are "give n" in a temporal
now in a "primal impress ion" within a conSlant now of lime
consc iousness. Keeping with the image or thi s fl ow, ex pe ri ences
"flow away" rrom my current living Now. Though retai ned within
a cenain halo or "tail" rrom my present Now, the ex peri ence of
somethin g recedes um il it va ni shes out of the periphery o r my
"me ntal eyes ight " into the stoc k of my me mo ry. " Periphery"
already connOles a cen ai n spat iality, namely a di stance from my
presem Now. Thi s distance becomes apparent when an ex perie nce
slips o ut of my re tention imo memory, when I forget what I had
just heard or thought. The very "act" or rorgetting questio ns the
apodiclic evidence of inner ex perience. Nevertheless, one need not
reach ror suc h strong examples. The "rading a lit" o f experience in
retenti on c hall enges the claim of apodicticity in inne r experi ence in
its totality. Inner experience can even deceive me; memory mi ght
be false or incomplete, etc. Having rull and total access to all fi elds
o r my consciousness wo uld mean that the ego disposes over a
divine consciousness.
In terms or adumbra ting. time ca n be seen as a cenain analogue
or space in the sense that. just as the spatiality of an Object prevellls
us from gai ning a rully transparent view o r it, so the temporality o r
li ved-experience, prevents us rrom ha vi ng the to tality o r
con. ciou;ness ru lly and transparently. Since all actual experience
is " had" in the lived presem, the temporally extended nature of our
mental lire evades a complete overview. Because I view my mental
life in the reflective turning-back, I cannot "step outside" of it.
I will always have experie nces, also o r reflection, in a living
present. and this present will move to an ever-new present from
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whi ch prev ious ex peri ences w ill recede into reco llecti on. Husserl's
own co ncept of time-conscio usness be hind his back counte rs his
own c la im 10 apodictic evidence of inner experience.
Acco unting fo r this subtl y moves Hu sserl away fro m the
Cartesian mo tif of a podictic evidence o n the basis of ego cog i to
and leads to the second entry path. p,yc ho logy. Put otherwise, hi s
in sig ht into the range o r ex te nsion of thi s cog il o fo rces hi m to
ex pand the sphe re of the cgo. At the same time. one cann ot do
without thc ego, fo r there mu M be a synthesizing agc nt which binds
the cog ittll iones logelher wi thin one stream of consc iousness. Thus.
the form o f ego cogi/o cogilQlU1I/ is the ge ne ral in va ri ant form o f
a ll consc io us life. The questio ns. then, wi ll have to be a) how to
charactc ri ze thi s " fi e ld" o f cogi ta tioncs and, more im portantl y, b)
how to account for it methodical ly. Husscrl has to give answers to
two inte rrelated q uestions: what kind of a na lysis can there be of
thi s phe no me na l fie ld , lIlId how is thi s poss ible, if thi s field
structure in its enti relY escapes th e clai m for apoci icLic ev idence'?

What is the theme of phenome nologica l research if the ego is more
than an e mpty ego po le a nd how can onc access it app ropriatc ly?
How can one accouIll for co n sciou~ n ess if conscious ness itself has
a ho ri zona l structure?
From its incep ti on in the Logical In vestigatiolls, phenomeno logy e ndeavo rs to ana lYLe consc iousness. The "posit ive" di!,ci pl inc fo r thi s is, natu ra ll y, psyc ho logy. What phe nomeno logy,
however. aims at mov ing from fac ts about the human min d to
essenccs, an ei detic science. Hencc. phe nomcnological psycho logy
is a ve rita bl e d isci pli ne pe rfo rm ed on the basis o f a n ei de tic
dcsc riptio n of conscious phe nomena. S truc turin g this disc ipline has
it s own proble ms and diffi c ulti es (under the rub ric o f e ide ti c
va ri ati o n). Sys te matica ll y carryi ng thi s out wo uld (leI' se lead to a
sc ie nce, the envis io ned phe nome no logica l psyc ho logy. Hu sserl
devo ted ex tensive research of how to carry out thi s task in a
systematic fa shion25 . What is aimed at is a po~ ili ve science within

25. Thi~ error! can be~ t be ... een 111 the lecture cour,c from 1915. Phiillome·
I/%giw:he Psyclw/ogie, J-/lla IX.
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the who le o f the spi ritua l sc ie nces (Ce isle."l'issel1 sc//{/jl ell ) in the
fra mework of which psychology wo ul d be fo llowed by the sc ience
o f communal spirit (CellleillgeisI)16. However. thi s di sc ipline
re main s bound to the natural attitude. In o ther wo rds. psycho logy
enta il s thc the matiza tion o f a n e idetics of (wo rldl y) consciousness.
but no t tra nscende ntal subjec ti vi ty. becau se psyc ho logy as a
pos iti ve !-!c icncc rcmain~ blind to th e tran scendental dimension.

He nce. Husserl has to show how phe nome no logica l psycho logy
can mo ti va te th e redu ction from wo rldl y to tra nsce nd e nta l
consciousncss. Or. whic h says the same. he has to ex plain why a
ph eno meno logica l psyc ho logy mu st necessa ril y lead to the
lra n ~ce nd en la l .

Thi s mOtivat ion li es in the doctrine of the splitt ing o f the ego,
whic h treats the proble ms arisi ng from ex panding the ego to a fi e ld
structure. II' consciousness is more than a n ego pol e but a who le
sphere o f consc ious li fe. then the qucstion o f the aget/ I carry ing o ut
thi s di sci pline becomes press ing. The age nt Husserl ca ll s the
" unpartic ipating observe r"11. An overvie w of this sphere -which
turns o ut to be a sphere of illle rsubjecti ve conscious life- harbors
the danger of d isso lvin g thi s ve ry age nt whi ch stri ves to gain a n
uninhibited view over transcendenta l life. The life I ex pe rie nce in
intros pecti on. however. is noth ing but the life o f the agem itse lf. I
can o nl y attain it by intros pection. Thu s. re fl ec tin g on o ne ' s own
conscious life not onl y yie lds acce" 10 thi s consciou, ness. It also
c reates the fo ll owi ng pro ble m : how ca n I ha ve access to thi s
consc ious life as such if I can never step outside o f my indi vid ua l
sell"? How ca n I experi e nce thi s spiritual region, which is not my
reg io n onl y. w ithout losi ng my indi vidua lity? I can inhibit the
gene ra l thes is o f the natura l altitude and turn to my co nscious
in wardness. Bul how am I to charac teri Lc lhe rel ati onship between

26.

On the topic of "Gcmci n£cisl" cfr. H lw X I V. pp. 165-231.

27. Thi .. notion i... in trou uceu in the begi nni ng of th e 201;, probab ly the
cnrli e\, mc mioning i .. In be found in the lAlit/fIJI LeCfUrl! \' from 1922. A lrc;Jdy in
the lect ure CQur.,c from 1 92312~ (ErMe Philosuphie) the term ~ec l1l ~ welle~ l ab l h h ed and h;u. ih di . . ti nct mClJning: err. Hila V III . pp. 116-13 1.
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myselr, the observing agen!. and Ihal which I observe ir the laller is
Ihe who le sphere of consciousness?
JuSI as in any science there is a region 10 be observed and the
observer. there must be the same structure in the case or phenomenological psychology. Only here we have the curious silUation that
the observer and observed are or one and the same essence. Hence,
an artiricial rupture, which splits the ego into an observer and a
thematic field, can only allain this dirrerence or the same: it, own
consc ious life. " In my li ving preselll I have in coex istence the
doubled ego and the doubled ego act: thus the ego. which now
cOlllinuously observes le.g.J the house, and the ego. which carries
out this act: '1 am aware that I am continuously observing the
house' 1".J"~8 In principle this doubling h:" no limi!. I can always
again reflect upon thal which I have just observed and again reflect
upon this reflection ill illjillilllm. I can always make the pan of the
ego, which J reflect upon, patent whereas the reflective ego wi ll
remain laten!. However, the reflection by a lalent ego will render
the latent ego patelll, etc~9 This infinite regre" -which 10 Husserl
is "undangerous"- reveal s the reflecti, e " 1 can". Although the
rellection upon yet another ego-pole teaches me nothing new, the
possible "iteration" or rellection proves the reasibility of the
relleetive faculty or consciousness.
Whereas this itcralion adds no new ins ight il1lo the nature or
consciousness, the splilling into the observer or conscious lire and
consciousness itself can only occur as a radical spli!. a rupture
within the originally unitary conscious lire." aive" lire has its
breaks and ruptures. but i, overall unitary. Hence, the break with
the natural allillldc in the cpochc is 10 be conceived as precisely
this split between the philosophizing ego and that which it
ob,erves, consciou",CSS itselr. The epoc he is nothing but a radical
splillillg or the ego. Hence. the reflective ego is no longer under the
~pell of the general thesis, but it reflectively lUrns its allention
10 consciousness which is intentionally directed at the world.

2K
29.
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For the discussion of p:ltcnt and latent Ego dr . 1-/11 (1 VIII. pp. IJO-9:!.
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An allCrnalive formulalion of "being direcled at the world b
"being interested in it:-, affairs", From here, the term "uninterested

observer" becomes unde"wndab le as laking a position in the
particular sense of nOI being interesled in the general thesis of
positing the world as existing in different ways. Husserl prefers the
term "unparticipating" to describe the "status" of thi, agent as the
term "uninterested" implies a potenlial indifference towards
everything. To be ,ure. the observer is interested in knowledge
about consciousness - he is interested in a way that the natural ego
cannot be ·'imerested". A lternative ly, "unparticipating" suggests
that the philosophiling ego does not assert the general thesis of the
natural attitude.
This splitting enables a view of the totality of conscious life.
This is not a "view from nowhere" because I gain access to my life
by distancing myself from il Ihrough this split. What can this lell us
about the discipline of phenomenological psychology insofar as it
is a poi11l of access to phenomenology' Is it necessary for it to be a
lran!'-cendental di\ciplinl' ? Ultimately. il has In he. However. it is
possible to practice an eidetic science of consciousness. Here, too.
there is the difference between an agent performing this science
and the region this science themalizes. Likewise, we would equally
have to presuppose a sp littin g. Nevertheless. as long as this
discipline does not inhibit the general thes is. it remains on the
grou nd of the natural attitude as a positive scie nce. Hence,
mundane consciousness thematizes itself a, part of the world. In
the hierarchy of the foundational strata of nature and spirit this
discipline thematizcs conscious life on the basis of nature. The
"personalistic" altitude necessary to access it is an abstraction from
the natural altitude which experiences the whole of constituted life.
By contrast. transcendental subjectivi ty is not part of the world.
but it opposes the world as the product of its constitution.
Transcende11lal subjectivity is not ill the world: it cOllsTiTuTes the
world . Only the splitting of Ihe ego makes plausible the possibility
for the observer to have a transcendental experience while
remaining a mundane ego. The ego is at the same time an object in
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the world and a subject for tile world JO Alternatively. a phenomenological psychology. based in the nalUral altitude. is possible. The
transcendental viewpoint. already accessed in the Cartesian way.
clarifies that this discipline. as a positive science. remains
incomplete and methodically ambiguous. A true phenomenological
psychology necc",orily is forced to perform the reduction and
move from a mundane into a transcendental register. Thus. phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology arc
"paral le l" discipline,. This parallelity. however. vanishes with the
realiLaLion that this con"ciousness themati/ed is nothing but
transcendental consciousness once one has inhibited the general
thesis. Or. viewed from the side of the world. mundane consciousnes, is an incomplete "part" or "layer" of consciousness that. seen
in its transcendental register. is not part of the world. but opposed
to it in terms of the correlational apriori. Hence. a methodical consideration of phenomenological psychology reveals "that the
consiste nt and pure execu ti on of thi s task of a radical reform
of psychOlogy had to lead. of itself and of necessity. to a science of
transcendental subjectivity and thus to ib transformation into
a universal transcendental philosophy".' I.
Apart from viewing psychOlogy a, an entrance gate to transcende ntal phenomenology or to conceive of psychology as a preliminary discipline before a lreatment of "consciousness as such",

another result appear•. expanding the Cartesian way into a fullblown transcendental di,eipline_ namely the unparticipating
observer. Contrasted with the Cartesian approach. the establishing
of this agent as "saving" the philosophi/ing agent from becoming
lost within the vast field of transcendental. Ihe latler turns out to be
Iranscendelllal intersubjectivity. Establishing this ob,erver retains
the radicality of the Cartesian approach as it insist, on a philosophizing ~Igent who practices lhi~ illlro~pection. but moreover tal-..e~
over responsibility for its own actions a, a philosopher. Not by
accident is Sacra/i'.> Ihe archetype of a radical philosopher_ "ho

30. Kn.I/.\. PI'. IH1 ff.: Crim. PI'. 17811'.
31 . Kri\i.. , p. 203: ;.liter Crif( ,\. p. 207.
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ha, fou nd the fo unda ti on o f all know ledge in h im,el)"u. For
HUl,se rl. pmcti ci ng radica l self- intro> pecti on equate, li ving up 10
the ethi cal ideal of ,clf- rcspon,ibility. Thi s ex pli cit establi shing o f
th e phil osophi ca l o b,crve r thu s o pe ns th e pa th to "e thi ca l"
con, ide rati ons of the ro le of the philosopherl).
The movement from the Cartesian approac h to the way via psyc ho logy e nables Hu"erl to harmonize the 111'0 requireme nls which
sati sfy hi, tas k of rad ica l and ri goro us sc ie nce. The first tas k is that
0 )" foundin g a sc ient ific d isc ipline whic h phenomenology cl aims 10
be - hence more than a foundation in an ego. rather a di sc ipl ine of
the cog it ata of thi s cogi/() . The second requireme nt is th at o f
li ving up to the "epistemo logico-eth icar' (erkellllllliseliliscil ) ideal
of full y legi ti mi/ ing the ac tion, of the philosopher. As such. this
science presents an ideal fo r all o ther sc iences. The idea o f ,cience
as well as that of the scie nti st arc products of an eidetic vari ation.
and hence appl y to all fac tual appcamnces o f them"The way via psycho logy is and re main s, howeve r, the grand
path inlo phe no me no logy. sin ce such a psychology leads necessa rily into tra nscende ntal phenomeno logy. Psycho logy, as Husserl
say' in the Crisis. is the "field of decision" for a correct framin g of
tnt nsce ndel1la l phe nome no logy. To say it diffe rentl y. the mode rn
separati on into psycho logy a nd transcende nt'11 phil osophy has led
10 the fal eful ueve)o pme nt in mode rn philosophy (e.g., psychologism). Hu sserl ', tnm ,cende nlHl phe no me no logy can be seen as
nn effort 10 combine both strands gone al.tray into one transce ndental di sci pline.

32 . efr. lllw VII. pp. 91"1".

33. For an accoun t of the role of rc... pon~ i bili I Y in lI us'il!rJ' \ philo\ophy, cfr.
the co n c i ~e text from H H.I), K .: ·'Ev ldent. und VCr3l11 wurtung" in: M . FLE:.l SC IIi R.

cd .. Phi/o .m phell

t!e~

CX l en'i l ve trea tmen t "

20. Jahrillmderts. Darnl'" tadt 1989. pro 79-94 . A more
to bl! fou nd 111 Fr. K LSH:.R. Wege der Vel"{lll tworf'UlR.

H II\H' rIJ Phiillom£'lI%l{ie

0/\

CUllg

dltrf" die

FlIkfi:.itiif.

Dordrccht/Bo . . tonl

London 1996 (Phacnomcilologicn. 138).

34. Thi...

is

HU'I,crr, pa th into phenomenology in (he

Mcd itmion .... dr. e.. p. Cartl'sitllll'c'he M I'dilllfirmt'lI.

**

Cartc~i:.ln

(!)

3-5.
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The Way via the Life-world

In his lasL aLlempL LO pre;enL an inLroducLion inLo phenomenology in the Crisis, Husserl proposes yeL anoL her way, LhaL via the
life-world (Lhe onLological way)35. AlLhough he already pursued
Lhi s paLh in his lecture; and research nOles, iL is nOl until the Crisis
that iL achieves iLs mOSL mature presentation. WiLhout devaluaLing
his previous ULlempts. Husserl considered this paLh the principal
one. What arc its main line, of thought?
InsighL inLo the naLure of transcendenLal consciou,ness reveals
"the transcendental" to have essenLially intersubjective and a
geneLic dimensions. SchemaL ically. Lranscendental subjecLiviLy is
expa nded inLo Lhese LWO major dimensions: as a field of consciousness it is nOL "only" a subjecLiviLY bUI always already an intersubjecLiviLY. Furthermore. the description of Lhis Lranscendental
field is incomplete if only ana lyzed in a ; taLic register. The ;tatic
description turns out to be merely a stratum within an encolll-

pass ing w hole of a geneLic development 16 The combination of
both expansions can be termed generaLive phenomenol ogy37.
Phenomenology in Lhis full sense as the theory of con;titution
accoun LS for how transcendental con ciou,ness form s the world.
That implies that on ly a full undersLanding of this consciousness
can give the philosopher a concep t of the world as life-world. Since

35. err. I. KI~RN. "Die drci Wcgc zur Ir:l"vendenwl-phlinomcilologischcn
Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund J-I usscrb", In: Tijd.\chriJt l'i)or Filmofle.
Bd. 24 (1962). PI'. 303-49. here pp. 327 fL Unlike Kern . I differenl;"'" the way
via the life-world proper frol11 Ihat via regional on{Ologie~. Whcrca~ Kern COUIl I~
thi~ path a\ belonging 10 the fonner. I consider it as beionglllg to the way via the
po~itiyc "dence ... and as I;uch have I treated it a... pan of B. Kern him ... elf says that
the full notion of an ontology of the life*world \... "an idea of the laic H us~crl"
(ibid .. 327) and it will be tre,lIcd accordingly a, the way Hu!. ... erl pur... ucs in the
Crisi.'i.
36. efr. the imponant lext on "siatic and genetic method" in H IW XI.
pp.336-45.
37. The devclopment from Malic to gcncllc method and from genelic 10
generative phenomenology il, dlscusscd in Stclnbock', H ome and BewlI/d,
Generative Phenomenology after Hus...erl (Evan~LOn. 1995),

88

REDUCTION ANI)

PHENOME~OLOGIC AL

METHOD

transcendeillal consciousne,s as world conslituting and Ihe lifeworld as the product of constitution are correlatives, thematizing
either oj them offers a way into phenomenology. The way via
psychology and that via Ihe life-world complemelll each other.
Whether I take my point of departure from consciousness in the
mundane sense and reduce to its transcendeillal "counterpart" or if
I inquire back from the pre-given life-world. in both cases I arrive
at transccndental (inter-) subjectivity as the ultimate. "abwlutc
being" which constitutes the worldJ~.
If inquiring back into transcendental consciousness reveals the
world as what it truly is -a product of the transcendental
constitution- only then can transcendental phenomenology render
a real understanding of what the world i". i.e ., a life-world,
constituted by a totality of monad, . In other words. as long as the
world is not analyzed in this way, it has not been fully understood.
This is also a critique of the positive scicnces. It is not such much
that they have given up their ideal to account for the essence of the
world (otherwise they would make no sense) as much as they have
pursued a wrong path. In so doing they have been blind to the true
being of the world in so far as they have abstracted from it and
have forgotten its basic c haracter. This is the main theme in the
Crisis, where Husserl tries to make a statement diagnosing his time
and to show how transcendental phenomenology can help solve
this crisis. Thi, " missionary" mOlive of Husser!'s philosophy goes
back to the Kai:o-Artic1e from 1922, in which he calls for a
"renewal" of the European spirit J9 When some 15 years later he
diagnosed a "crisis" in modern European culture, he reverts to the
same motive. In both cases. one can reduce the solving of the crisis

38.

dr.

On the que ... tion of the ·'ab ... olutc bemg" of Iwn,cendentaJ "'UbJCCli\'iIY

HIIlI

VIII. pp. 497·506. and Landgrebe'., \\or"' .... c'p. "Mediwlion tiber

Hu .. ,erl!<. WOri

"O I C

Ge ... chichtc

1\1

gro6e .... akwm de, ab . . ohllen

eim,", in:

Fakli:.!tlillllllll"dh'id,w/wlI. Humhurg. 198:2, pp. 3X·57,"
39. Only two of the rhe KlIi:.o arlicle~ were publi\hed in the Japane se
journal "The Kai zo" (RcnC\\iil): Ihey have been publi"hcd <ts a whole III /-Ifill

XXVII. PI'. 3-94.
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to the formula: the world must be saved through rigorous science,
this science ultimately being phenomenol ogy40
What does the crisis

or mode rn

European sc ience consist in? In

. hon, it has moved away from the life-world by its method of
mathematization. This process is thm of an ab;,tnlction which has
converted th e world into a mathemaLical univer~e",n. Two corre-

lati ve results follow: Firsl. sc ience abs tracts from Ihe "rear' world
a nd lives in its own world. in a world of formulae. Second and as a
consequence. it loses sight of the orig inal life-world from which it
emerges. In its abstractive move away from the life-world. science
not onl y loses sight of it but it replaces it wi lh the scientific world.
The life-world has become covered up by a scientific view of this
world Ih al. in faci. does nO[ see Ihe world as what it is in its
origina l sense: a world of pre-sciemific. pre-philosophical life.
However. what notion of life is at stake here'? Is not the sciem ifi c
form of life a very special and "dignitied" form? In what sense can
the life-world, accordingly, be pre-scientific?
There can be no doubt about Husser!'s unceasingly high regard
for science. One must never understand his call back to Ihe lifeworld as depaning from the ideal of a "scicntiric" mastery of the
world. Only a crass misreading of Husserl's famous quole of the
dream of rigorous science .Iending'· can intcrpret it as Husserl's
own opini on 42 ", The phenomenological approach does lhcmati7c lhe

world as a life-world bUI o ne of il s goals is 10 bring Ihe sciences
back on Inlck. Thus. phenomenology does nol devaluale Ihe
achievements of lhe posilive sc iences bUI wants to embed Ihem in
40. A certain "missionary" IInpclus can :11'0 already be found in his article in
L080\ from 1911.

'·Philo~ophy

u... Rigornu~ Science"'· . And in

rI

certain ,en .. !:'

already the Logical If/I'e.\·rigar;nl/s nwkc the claim ror u radical reform of
psychology. and from therc the totality of science'>.
4\. efr. the fll11101lS Galilci - paragraph in the Cri..,i~ (§ 9) for a detailed
reconstruction of this process.
42. efr. Kri.~i.\". p. 508: C,.;.\;\. p. 389. The ,UlIemcnt "The dream i... over·· i...
mther a quOIc Husser! pUIS into the mouth of his opponent .... 111 which he ironit.:ally
formulates the absolute antithesis of his own pO\ilion. efr. abo Carr's
interpretation of 1hi" quote in hi~ tran,l:ttor"s IIl1roduction. Crisis. XXX r. 'IS well
itS [he footnote 21 on p. XXXI .
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an all-embracing !-.c icnlifi c l!ndeavor. AgiJin. what does Hu ... ..,crl

mean with life-world '!,,·l When he asserts that the sciences live in a
world of abstraction, the c ru x i, Ihat they do nOl live in the world
a, it is found in "ordinary" life. They live in the world of science
thai is opposed to the pre-scielltific world. The life-world is hence
the world of Ihe pre-' iel1lific allitude. It is nothing hut the world
the natural allitude has as its corre late. It is the , ubjecti ve- relative
world of <I,i_llI as opposed 10 Ihe world of episteme. Not only i, thi s
world always already " leaped over" by modern _sc ience , it has
never prec isely ill its pre-scientific characte r been the the me of a
sc ie l1lifi c e ndeavor. lI owever, the pre-scientific life-world is the
basis of all human actions. natural or scientific.
Hence. it i the task of phenomenological renection fir;t of all
to Ihe mati ze thi s life-world. i.e .. to re-cove r it by uncovering the
ab"ractive laye rs thai have become laid over it. Husserl ca lb for a
" reduc tion lO th e life-world ". On e must understand Ihi s as a
redu ction in the specific ;ense of an "opening up" because the lifewo rld has been forgotten

hy modern man in "'Iri ving for a o.;cientific

m'''tery of the world. Siric tl y spea ~in g. o ne ca nn ot ca ll thi s
forgetfulne;.s. since it never was thcmatizcd in the first place. It has
the character of a "prima l dma".
Paradoxi ca ll y. one must ca rry o ut this redu ci ng to the presc ienlifi c world as a scien tifi c endeavor aimin g at a uni vc r~al
"ontology of the life-world" +1. As s uch it would be carried out in
the natural att itude. The natural attitude ha\ bee n under;lOod as a
lower form of the transcendental attitude and ca n onl y "artificially"
be re"ituted. This cou ld be interpreted as contrad icting Hu"eri ',
own intenti ons in that he ~ccms 10 neglect th e mea ning of th e

43. The amwcr wluch will be gl'l'cn in the 1'0110\.\ IIlg

1\

but one read!!l!! of

l! u.....crJ' ... concept urlhe Id-c· ""orld. A.., Clm; .. gc.. ha ... ..,h(Nn. \C\craJ concept ... have
gone into the forming of Ih., notion . Here. I will foell .. on tht: pre-..,cicnlific a\pcc!
of It. err. U. CLAESGES. "Z""Cldcullglcih::n

(op .cit .,: a\ \\ell

a~

R.

B()I~ HM.

In

Hu \ ...crl ... Lcbcll ... wclt-Bcgrifr,",

"lIw... erh drci Thc ...en tiber die Lcbcn,wcl!" 111:

E. STROKER (cd .). Lebemll'elr /1IIt! \vis,\(!lIsdflljr ",
Franlfurt. 1979. pp. 23 -31.
44
fr. Cri.d,\ , 5 1.

1i 1H'~er/fij .

tiN

PI/ilmopll/e Edmulld

*
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reduction. However, one ha, to insist thut first seeing the life-world
as such ("s tripped" of idealizations) owes to a reduction . This "lifeworld reduction" reduces to the world before any idealiLation s and
reveals the sphere of basic life that is the "presupposition"45 of any
acti vity46.
The idea of an o ntology of the life-world has been o ne of the
1110St fruitful ideas in the late Hu sser!. What thi s ontology consi"s
of and how it i, to be carried out, s ha ll not be discussed here.
However. this di scipline is important in our context. because it also
yields a way into thc transcendental once we realize that the lifeworld is a produc t of com,titutio n. Indeed, this concrete world of
the natural attitude cannot come in to view if we do not practice a
univen,al epoche from thi ' nat ural att ilude in order to thematite it.

-15 err. K,.;si.~. p. 105: CriJi\. p. 103.
46. Where,.\'t 11 b known thai Hus ..erl III tr)ing w rc\eal thi~ Ilatural Iifcworld i ... innuenced by A\'\!nariu..,' notion of the ""lIli/rhelle Weltbl'griJr. II 1\
hl\loricnlly inlcrc,>ling 10 mention lhat in a Ire.lIlllent of Avenanu!'>' philO'.ophy, the
philo ... opher Leopo ld ZII:GU-R. in hl<; c\,·,ay "Ueber cinlge Begriffc dcr
'PhJlo,ophie dcr relllen Erfahrung'" (0" Jome fUJI/om of 'phi/mop"" of !,ure
experience'). in: LO.':'I,\ II. 1911111. IIcrt 3. pp. 316<\49. U'l,CS preci.-.cly the tcrm
"reduction" to charac tcri/c the movement nccc\",ary 10 uncover this "world":
" However. the pl~1Il of an intentionally ahi~ltJric.d comportment to the world i!'! not
easily curried Ihrough. A brief rencction J1lU~t Ic.tch Ihe phil o:-.ophcr the
iml>O!'!!'!ibllily to ju~t simply think about the w()rlel. For what i\ lhe v. orld'! I.. , ) All
of lhe ~uddcn a la~k of il\ own difficulty ari,c, before the thinker. That i't, to lead
the "world" back l:,ufllckJI111reflllo "uch "Impll fied ha,ic notions. '0 Ihal It in II,
IOtaillY become\ mantlgcable IIwl1lllichl (0 thought. manageable "umd'wiJlidd for
hlllmm spiril. On Ihl\ fir,t reduction. which nccc",arily ha, to be carried through
in the development of UIlY philo"ophy. depend, nOI only lt~ further conception
IDllrc""i/eI/I/lgl. il"> organi/ntion: rather. il remain\ al .. o guiding lIJl'Stll1l1tl(,fldl for
the relalionship and the cOlltradiction of ~cllO()l\ and directions , which hi .. lOry
e numerates, The ~ll11plificaliol1, vio lcnt a., well a, 1Il3\Oldable. 01 the "all and
everything" to original. complimen ting Ilotion~ ,uch u, infinite and fini te, moving
and resting, becoming ;lIld being. one and many . lemporal and cternal. bcing·forit ...elf and bcmg·for·u ... con ...ciou ... and ullconsc iou .... bod) and soul. thlllking and
being. state of affair... IZIJ,wmdl and object (C<'gt'fI,Hlmd) - thi ... ,implification
... how.., to the conal..,~eur [Kellnerl a multitude of ~YMcmatic account-. and
hi.,torical philosophcmc .... which in all part ... arc governed by Ihe redUCllon of
bcginllll1gs. Perhap ... no thinker but A\'cnariu . . ha ... ,0 much tried to make the
effort. a., theorctica lly ull ... u'picioll ... ly a, po..... iblc. 10 hreak rcnlity down into ..
number of last basic notion ..... (pp. 316 r.. my tran'lI~lIlon).
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We lIeed the reduc ti on to uncover the sphere of tran scendental
subjectivity that constiWlcS this world as the world of the natural
ani tude. from which any activity lakes its sland. Onl y by understanding the transcendental as constituting can we have access to
the world in its base-function . i.e" as pre-philosophi cal life- world .
In Dlher words, the red uc tion must even go beyond the philosophi cal . ta ndpo im and the phenomeno logi st has to make his or
her way back inl o the natural aniwue. however without forge uing
its tran scendental ··origin". Husserl has called thi s reverse mo veme nt "enworlding".
II is only through a uni ve rsa l epoche thm we can auain a full
notion of the corre lational relation ship between world and
tmnscendemal subj ectivity. As Kern put s it: "only the ontological
way hence grasps subjectivity really as transcendental""? Only an
ontology of the life-world auains a view of the world in its
uni versa l dimen sions. After all. also the world of the sc ienti st is a
"world;' even tho ugh it depends upon its un-thematic basis. the
life-world . The world is thu s a universal foundation. The relativity
of mulIipl e inte rests a nd different home-world s res ts upon
transcendemallife as the absolute ground.
Since transcendental subjectivity and life-world are correlates in
the framework o f constitlilion. gaining a full vision of either one
illdudes the possibility of understanding the other: one COllll ot go
without the other. Only from the standpoint of an ontology of the
life-world can one prac tice the transcendental reduction . Likewise,
only through a full analysis of the laHe r in its broade .. t dimensions
can we understand the world as the product of constitution and thus
as what it ultimately is: a historic world of life with its genesis and,
a; the region of all regions, a ground on which hi stori c "subjectivities" have developed and can ever develop. Only from thi s
pers pective can pheno me nol ogy ultimately thematize the lrans ce",lenw{ problem of hi story. It then becomes undcrstandable why
Hu sserl in sists that the reduc ti o n in no way mcans an impoverishment Or a "reduc ing" of the world to some singular tran s-

47 .

KI·.RN.op. cit .. p. 344 (my Lran slation).
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cende nlal ego. In rac!. the reducti o n opens up ;1 view o n the world
by transcending the naivete of the natural attitude to a uni ve rsal
standpo in!.
Furthe rm o re, the discovery of the genetic dimension of
const itution revea ls the life-world to be not o nl y histo ri cal but also
to have its own "'laws o r ge nesis". Trac ing back. the hi story of
the life-world in its decisive developmental steps - i ts prima l
institutings- reveals these as developments on the way to tra nscendenla l phenomenology itself. The sketch o r phenomenological
"archeology" Husserl performs in th c first part of the Crisis in
going back to the first rudimentary forms or mmhematization in
ancient Greece is nothi ng but a ge netic reconstru cti o n of how
science has come about in a certain historical sit uati on. It is a

reconstru cti o n of how it has arise n from the pre-philosophical lire-

world through a radi ca ll y new idea. the mcnhematization o f nillure.
But the re is a lso a "prog ressive' side to hi sto ri ca l analysis.
Husser!"s reconstruction of the hi story of philosophy 10 modernit y
is also an effort to tra ce primal institutings

by

interpretin g thi s

hi story as coming ever c loser to the discovery of transcendental
s ubjecti vit y until it -in this very muc h like Hcge l- rcaches its
dec isive breakthrough in phenomenology. However, hi sto ry does
no t sto p but rathe r proceeds from here in a new style. Thus, by
inte rpretin g history as a c riti ca l hi story o r ideas4B ha ving a
teleo logica l developme nt, it culminates in the red ucti on as the way
into a transcendental reconstruction or the hi , toric life-world .
To su m up, I ha ve prese nted the three major ways into phenome nol ogy systematically. Although Hu sse rl never achieved a
syste mati c account o f these ways. he was convi nced that there in

fact was an underl yi ng

~ys tema li cs.

In this sense. Lh crc is uhi -

mate ly but o ne way which ma y have its different procedures or
variati o ns. the way through the life-world . I shall e nd thi , section
with a self-critical quote. in one o r Hu s!.erl' s last manuscripts fro m
1937:

48.

Thi ... j, the title of (he firq pnrt lIf (he lecture coun.c Ull ErMe

Philwophie.
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I have drafted different introduction, into Iranscendenlal phenomenological philo!.ophy .. . We shall see thai this lifeworld (Iaken omni -Iemporally) is nOlhing bUI Ihe historic
world. From here. il becomes conceivable thm a complete
systematic introduclion into phenomenology begins and is to
be carried through as a unive"al hi storic problem . If one
introduces the epoche without the historic framing. then the
problem of the life-world. i.e .. of universal hi story. still
linger>. The introduclion in Idells does in fact retain its right,
but I now consider the historical way to be more principal
and ~ystcmalic"9.

3.

CONCLUSION A D CRITIQUE:
AND liFE-WORLD

TilE

REDUCTION BETWEtN EGO

In many characteriza ti ons and metaphors Hu !)!)erl tried to

determine what he meant by the reduction. Hi s sometimes emphatic or even ceremonious formulations make it clear Ihat he has
more in mind Ihan just solving a specific epistemologica l problem .
Or rather, the epistemological problem in its full dimensions is of
such importance that solving it is comparab le to a full conversion
of humankind . However literally these comparisons are to be
understood. Hu sserl ma~es it clear in many lellers in the last
decade of his life that he considers the reduction his greatest
discovery and he is convinced that it is also the most difficult part
of his philosophy. and thal "t he reduction" is much morc than a
purely methodica l de' icc. At times it becomes a synonym for the
e"ence of his philosophy. Let us look al the consequences to
which this method leads.
The di,cussion of the ways into the reduction ha, shown that
there are 111'0 focal points the reduction leads 10: the life-world as a
constitulional product of the full ,cope of the lranscendental. on the

49. Hila XXIX, pp. 415

r. (my Ifilll'.. lalion).
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one hand . and Ihe ego Ih al. as Ihe un pan ici pm in g observer o r
transcende nlal lire. is Ihe basis ror apod ictic evidence. on the other.
Wh at a re Hu sser)' s inte nt io ns in roc usin g on th ese two
phenomena?
Lei us stan wi th the ego o r the phe nomeno logist. Establi shing
th e o bserver o r tra n_ce nde ma l li re in the very proce" o r
constitllling the wo rld places the ph ilosopher in Ihe position or
accounting ror this tra nscende ntal lire. T hi s agency is always and
in lhc last instance " my own" lire. Accounling fo r it is more than
an epistemo logical task. S ince the phe no menological sc ie mist has
to leg it imate he r ac ti on" she is guided by a lhe mati c "baseli ne,"
res ponsi bi lity. Accou ntin g ro r one's ow n dee pes t "se lf' is more
than j usl pe rro rming another scie ntiri c "job"; it is a tas k o r the
hi ghest responsibil ity. The "di g nit y" or Ihe philosophe r's ac ti vity
ste ms from hi s dut y to ac t res ponsibly as a researc he r. In rac t,
"acting rightfull y" in doi ng philosophy is so muc h an elhical issue
tha t one canno t conceive o f philosophy as being o nl y a "job." It is
rather a "vocation". In thi s Hu sserl ma kes use or the German Bel'll!
Uo b) as deri ved from BeruJilllg (vocation}so. Being a "good phil osopher" is an ethi cal idea l. T his does not mea n that everyone ought
to become a philosophe r. However. becoming o ne mea ns not o nl y
ac hi ev ing the hi ghest dig nit y hu manl y possible but a lso livi ng
humanness. whic h consists in rati onality. to the rull est. Becoming a
phil osopher as the one who has pe rro rmed the reduc ti o n a nd
di scovered absolute lire "wi thin" him- or herself. mea ns rulfilling a
"self-rormin g or the ego through absolute re n ection 10 the absolutely genu ine human"si.
Becoming a ph ilo,ophc r as an idea l tas k equal s that o r justirying all or one ' s ac tions and taki ng responsibility ro r them. This
50. err. ' hw XX I X. p. 353 (m)' lran ... hllion): " 1<.; 'vocallon [Bend/II/g] :In
empty word? lI a, a philosopher e\er [ ... \ been a 'genuine' philosopher wilhollt
the dCllloni,m of \"ocationTlc ...... '? b phi lo,",ophy to the genuine philo..,ophcr u... a
random ... o·(ulled life·occupation I Lcbcn\bcrufj. 1\ it for him nOl rather falc.
which for hlnl h'h decided over ocing and non·hcing?'·
5 1. "Selb!<.lgcslaltung de .. !eh durch ab ...olutc RcOcxioll lum abso lul echlcn
Mensche n" (A V 5/ 16b).
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lies with in the teleology of human (rational) faculties. If practical
rat ionality is a questi on o f freedom, the n the philosopher' s ac ti ons
in her " pheno me nologizing" acti vity are a genuine pur uit of freedo m. Mo reover, she is even more "free" since she has become
a ware o f thi s freedom as be ing a full instantiation of rationality
di scovered in leaving the boundaries o f the natural attitude.
Ye t, the tra nscendental life I di scover within myse lf through the
reduction is more than my own life. The reducti on teac hes precisely
th at transcenden tal ac hi eve me nts neve r belong onl y to me; the
wo rld is never a produ ct of my ac ti vity alone but o f a transcende ntal inte rsubj ectiv ity. Subjectivi ty becomes formed onl y in
terms o f othe rs, the o nes before me and afte r me, the o nes I have
never e ncounte red and never will e ncounter, etc. Thus, the reduction g ives access to transcendental life as such, breaking the spell
o f solipsism in ope ning a path 10 the other. In and thro ugh tra nscende ntal inte rsubjectivi ty we are bound togethe r in one spiritual
tolality. As suc h, Husserl called the philosophers in the Crisis the
" functi onaries of man kind" . They can ass ume this fun ction insofar
as taking over respo nsibility fo r myself directl y leads to all the
o the rs as united in the tra nscende ntal totality o f monads. The
phil osophe r has thus the do uble tas k. On the o ne hand he or she
inte rprets th e li fe of hum ankind in a n "abso lute" view. The
phil osophe r in hi s activ ity o f di scovering the truth has to g ive
account (/6gol/ did6nai) for the actions of mankind in their relati ve
ways o f life and in the multitude o f wo rlds li ved in . Gi ving a
descripti on of thi life in thi s wo rld is the first ste p to judging
human acti ons. Thus, Husserl states programmatically in Ca rtesian
Meditations. " phe nomenOlogica l ex pli ca tion does nothing but
ex pli cate th e se nse thi s wo rld has for us a ll , pri or to any
philosophi zin g, and obvio usly gets solely from o ur ex peri e nce
-a sense whi ch philosophy can uncover but never alter. .. "52
On the other ha nd, the philosopher's ro le is that o f ca lling
ma nkind bac k to its teleologica l path . T hi s is the ro le that the
phil osopher and ci ti zen Hu sserl took up in the Crisis at a lime in
52.

Cartesianische Mediwlionen. p. 177: after Cartesiall MeditatioliJ. p. 151.
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whi ch not o nl y scie nce had devimed fro m the palh des ign:lIed but a
who le nati o n had go ne aSlray, be ing ca ughl up in a fre nzy o f
nationali sm and racism. HusserJ 's calling for a re form of scie nce in
the li ghl o f Ihe pOlitical upheaval in Nazi-Ge rman y mi ght seem
very naive. H owever, one mu st bear in mind wh at th e role of

sc ie nce was to Husserl.

Sc ie ntific and ultimate ly phil osophi cal

activ i ty are th e hi ghes t real i za ti ons of hum an life. In thi s

"emph atic" sense the philoso pher's role mi ght well be described
wi th Ni etzsc he as a " doctor of culture". A " cri sis" can a lso be
unde rstood in medica l te rms as the c rest o f a sic kness. Thus. the
phil osopher cannot directl y intervene in the course of hislOry - Ihe
sense o f the wo rld is one she ca n " never" a lte r. Rathe r. she can
o nl y reac t to a disease th at has already ta ke n its course; i.e .. she has
the dut y to point out whe re and why, from whic h moti ves. thi s
dev iatio n from the "good" pa lh has occurred and show poss ible
ways out of the cri sis.
However, des pite the e mphasis o n the phil oso phe r' s ro le o f
standing for humanit y, Hu sserJ ins ists on the " unique ness" and
" pe rsonal indecJinability"53 o f the phil osophi z ing cgo. Fo r all o f
hi s e mphasis upo n intc rsubj ec ti vity , the agent c an neve r be
"reduccd" to an irre levant mode within an inter-monadic tOla lity:
"The ''I'' that I alta in in the e poche. whic h wo uld be the
SHme as the "cgo" w ithin a critical re interprc tation a nd
correcti on o f the Cartes ian conception. is ac tually called " I"
o nl y by equi voca ti o n - tho ugh it is a n cssemi a l equi vocalion si nce, w hen I name

it in rellec ti on, I can say nOlhing

other th an: it is I who practice the epoche. I who interrogate,
a; phe no menon, the wo rld w hi c h is now va lid fo r me
accordin g to its bei ng and be ing-such. w ith all its human

be ings, of whom I a m so rull y conscious; it is I who stand
above all natu ra l ex istence th at has meaning for me, w ho am

the ego- pole o f thi s transcende mal life. in which, at first. the

53.
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wor!d has meaning for me purely as world: it i, I who.
in full concretenes,. encompass allthat"5-I.

ta~en

Hu"erl's philosophy remains a critical transcendental philo,ophy that can never do without an absolute ego as foundation and
staning point of all reflection. Even in a critical reinterpretation of
the Cartesian conception it i> precisely thi; "Cartesianistic" motif
that mu~l never be given lip. It i\ connected to the idea that there b
an apodictic foundation, an "Archimedean point" that provide, a
final foundation in the evidence of the ego '.I' {'ogiI0 55 . The consequence of the reduction pursued thu, far leads to a limited
validation of the "Canesian" Husser!. It i, from this approach only
that he can interpret the role of the philosopher in the whole of
cultural activity of mankind. In order to secure this "cuhuralphilosophical" implication and in order to enable the philosopher
to be more than a citi/en of an ivory tower, Husser! "needs"

Cartcsianism.
Yet. on the other side of the balances. there is the issue of the
life-world. which becomes increasingly imponant to Husser!'
Critics have interpreted Husser!'s turning to the pre-scientific
world as a "departure from Carte5,iani~m"~6. One can summari/e

the arguments for this interpretation essentially in that Husser!
reali7ed that he could not lay an apodictic foundation in the Ego.
Therefore. he (morc or Ie" consciously) abandoned this project
and instead turned to the life-world as the actual working lield of
phenomenology. Performing an "ontology of the life-world" i, the
true task for phenomenology. In order to do thi,. one does not need
a Cartesian reduction to a transcendental consciou,ness. Thu,. the
54 . Kr;sis. p. 1R8: after Crf,\/.fi, p. 184.

55. Merten .. has dc"ott.:u the 'ccolld half of hi ... ,.hove mentioned .. tudy to
.. howing Ihal Hu\~\!rl in hi ... 101'1 year- ha~ e ... ..,cllllUlly given up thi'i Ideal of

Jil

ultllnalc founding and m..:rgc ... bUlh ... keplic ant..! found:.uional mOllr. . in Ill.., concept
of venfication (Bell'ii"rwlI:). Howe"er. il seem ... to mc problemallc to apply Ihi ..
concept. which ha... Il' 'y,tCI1131IC locu ... In [he phenomenon of horiLOm. (amllhcir
prc\ulllllvity). to that of foum.lntlonali\m.
56. err. LA'IOORLBI. "Departure from Carte ... iurw,m", in L . LA!\lX.iRI81. Till'
Ph",wmel/(J/ogy of Edmund l-IInlt'rl. cd wilh <111 irurouuclion b) D. Welton.
Ithaca I London, 1981. pp. 66· 121 .
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departure has already occurred. as it were behind Husserl', back.
the moment he turned to the life-world as his primary field of
interest. This reading of Hlisserl's late philosophy has been very
dominant in the first decade~ after Husserl'~ death and has clearly
been influenced by Heideggers hermeneutic, of facticity.
Moreover. it has been insinuated that Hcidegger influenced Hu"erl
in his sketch of a life-world ontology. The fact that this ontology
was never worked out in detail and only hinted at in the Crisis was
taken as an implicit proof that the problem of the life-world was
almost an afterthought. It was an idea hinted at rather than clearly
seen in view of its consequences. namely, that

it would lead

10

an

abandoning of his transcendental project.
However. in the P:l,t three decades a good deal of manuscript
material from Husserl's Nacll/ass has been published showing that
a "theory of world apperception"57, is in fact not only worked out
in great detail; it has also become c lear that Husserl had been
working on a life-world interpretation already going back to the
second decade of the 20'h century. Since this material has become
available, the "departure"-thesis has become highly problematic
and there is eonscnsus among scholars that Husserl ultimately was
not able to "achieve" this last step. More importantly it could never
have been his intention to leave Cartesianism behind.
As has been shown, transcendental and ontological analysis
compliment each other. Therefore, the reduction is needed in order
to access this life-world, since in all "normal" pursuit of life it is
un-thematic. It remains all the more un-thcmatized in modern
science, which by abstracting from the life-world is nevertheless
bound to it unknowingly. Thematizing the life-world. as that which
is always un-thematized in the natural attitude. means already
having left the natural attitude. Nevertheless, this docs not mean
doillg Ulm)' with it. To the contrary, it remains the basic form of
life (the philosopher remains a citi/en. a father, a mother etc.).

57. Thi~
in LeU\ien. II
30icl;.
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From the tran scendent al standpoi nt one ullClc'"tands the natural
allitude as a "lower" altitude. or which says the same, the natural

altitude is already transcendental. yet without knowing il.
For an onto logy of the life-world. this entails: If Husserl speaks
of " restituting"58 the natural altitude in order to ga in a standpoint to
analyze the life-world. this cannot mean that we, the analyzing
phil o!>ophers. arc to "forget" the standpoint ga ined in the reduction.
Going back into the o ld altitude. resusciwting the old naivete,
is impOSSible. Rather, this ste p is to be understood as a quasi imaginary mo ve: I pretend to go bac k into the "old" altitude and
from the description of life-world can proceed in describing how
life in the natural attitude was like before I even became aware of
il. We can understand "restituti on" in this context as "reconstruction" of something that has been " un-built" in transcendental
analysis. This is why performing the reduc tion in no way stands in
contradiction with the task of a life-world ontology.
Ye t. although this discipline is o nl y "enabled" by the transccndcntul turn , thi s ontology soon takes on its own character.

Describing the world from its most primitive clements over first
formations of communa l life to hi gher-order personalities and
e nding up finally in c ultures, home-worlds. alien-worlds is a
gigantic lield o f research. The rich methodical instruments Husserl
has de ve loped in hi s development of the genetic method give him
the tool s needed to pursue this task . In fact, thi s method takes on
the charac ter of a hermencuti cs of thc life-world . It is a description
of how the world we live in has come to be and how it fun cti ons.
The term "hermeneutics" -which Husserl would not have used in
,his context- is designated to mean precisely thi s. It is rather a
descriptive than a normative discipline. In hi s analyses of Greek
c ulture and phil osophy. the "geneti c" is oftentimes undi stingui shable from faclllal-historical analyses 59 It is thu s nOt sur58

err. Krilis. p. 176.

Which hn!> cau~cd lI u~seri to be charged with ·'Eurocentri... m". Thll,
ca nnOI be rellCnt lCd here, but what c.m "",me" Hu ~'\erl from thcse
charg!.:" to a cenain cx;tCnI i~ hi ... methodic approach in which he ex;pli ci tl y docs
nOi W:1I11 to gi'Vc a factual · bi,u)rical account but rather onc of "laws of genes;is;'·. In
59.

di~Cll,\ioli
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pri sing Ihat sociology, po litical theory, hi slOry, and pedagogy ha ve
taken up Hu "eri' s ideas o n the life-world. Funhe rm ore. it cannot
be acci dc lIla l tha t the le rm "Lehe l/ .nrel," has beco me a ve ry
commo n noti on that nowadays has lilli e to do with its ori g in . The
very " munda ne it y" o f Ihe problem o f Ihe wo rld o f life ex plain s its
re mOleness fro m Lransccnde nta l questions.
ThU',. the inte rpretaLi on presellled here allempt s 10 o, ercome the
common asserti on that there b a "colllradicti on" between Hu ~se rl'~
Ca rtesian positi on and his "ccount o f the life-world. I have tried to
show th at a philosophi ca l the lll ati La ti o n o f the life-world is not
possible without the fo rme r. At Ihe same time, I ha ve insisted that
Husse rl \ Carl esian acco unt of the subject a nd hi s life-world
ont ology present /\\'o distil/ ct and in a ,e nse separate programs.
They arc projects Hus>erl pursues w ith differe nt aims. Whereas Ihe
"Can esian Hu"erl " pu " ucs a pmh of sciemific gro undin g and
foundatio n" li"". the " life-world Hu sserI" is intereMcd in what can
been ca lled a he rme neuti cs o f the wo rld o f everyd" y life. Both
projects "re set squa rel y ag,tinst eac h other I/ ot in the se nse thai
they comradic i or even "a nnul " eac h other, but in that they pursue
two diffe re nl age ndas. In fac t, one can purs ue o ne w hile complete ly neglecting Lhe othe r. One cal/ pUN,e a " theory" of the lifewo rld without a l all be ing interested in constituti o nal proble ms.
Likewise. one can imlllcr)o.c onese lf in lranscendcnwi matters in th e
traditi o n o f transcende ntal philoso ph y since Ka nt a nd Ge rma n
Ideali s m, and fruitfull y ul ili lc Hu sser!' , contribut io ns LO tran scende mal theorics 60 Due to the funda me nta l c ritic is,,,, o f reason
a nd ratio na lity in this ccnlUry in the wake o f critics o f e nli ghten-

hi\ lat~ te;.;t on 'Teleo logy III the H I'iOr) 0 1 Phdo\ophy"' he cven Gil '" (hi ...
rccon,lruct l'C rending an "111I~rprc l ation" : "Bul morc importanll ) \'c have 10
cou nler the obJecllon Ihat Ihe IlO'I liol1 pu l fonh here doc~ 1101 confi rm lfe.\h/t'lfmi
purely hl l,lorical lac l ~. but Ihat II I ... an inl crprcwliol}. i.e .. :l ... M I of ... ub"lruclio n of
fact... for which ull lc,ti mol1 ic.. i:lrC Int.'king" Ohm XX IX. p. 396. my tr<l n.. lalion).

60. Onc example of thi.. i.. 10 he found 11\ K . Dcsl''';G.
SelbJlbpu'ujJtH'III_,modelJe. Mot/erne Kririk('11 IIIIlI ,n'stemM/ficllf! £lItll'flr[e ;.ur
kOIlJ..reten Subjd tl\ ihil. Muni ch. 1997. where he ta l.. e.. up Il u.....crl a... one
'y!'!tcmalic vOice In :1 theory of a tr'.lI1 ...ccndc nt al theory of ...eil-coll'lciou.. nc!t". Cfr.

c'p. I 13- 16.
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menL, it is understandable why this path has been of less illlere,1.
This, however, can not be a reason to di"egard this aspect of
Hus,erl. In fac!' neglecting the Cartesian Husserl leads to
misunderstandings. These disregard the fact that Husserl never
even cmne close to considering transcendental phenomenology and
the idea(l) of rigorow, science a dream, let alone a dream that could
come

10

an end.

This leads. however. to the critique I would like to formulaic in
conc lusion. Husserl Jailed to combine these two major aspects of
his philosophical endeavor. There is neither just the Cartesian or
the life-world Husserl. There is of systematic nece"ity both.
However. there cannot be a syslemar;c pr;nciple uniting both. since
formulating such a principle would make the problematic step of
considering one of the two projects as absolute. The result of
valorizing one is a dcvalu:Hion of the other. Thi, consequence is
due 10 the Janus head of the phenomenological reduction.

The reduction thus has the dallhle meaning of calling humanity
to it, utmost possibilities of reason. 10 the "true" and "genuine'
human being in one', self. on the one hand. On the other. it is to
open up a full and all-embracing understanding of the world we
live in. including oUr>elves as dwellers in this world of interests
and distinct activities. However, there remains the conflict of
absoilite humanity and relatil'e life pursuit, or, to say it in
Ht",erl's famous formulation. we are len with the paradox oj
1IIIIIlall subjectivifY. the resolving of which nobody else can decide
but history ill>elf in which reason unfolds tclcologically-or where
there is always the threat that it di~per"es and even become, losl.
However, performing the phenomenologica l reduction to Husser! is
nothing but thc constant aHempt to "come 10 reason," although
there might be faclUal hindrances on the way 10 this ideal. One can
say that with the reduction Husserl has touched upon the fundamental il>Sue of freedom. the freedom to be oneself, or which is
to ~ay the same, the freedom to open oneself 10 rea~on as the true
meaning of humanness. The possibility of performing the pheno-
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menological reduclion would Ihus be idelllical with the extent to
which freedom is possible61 .
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61. Cfr. H.- I.. VAN BRI:;DA: "St!inc Freiheit wicder/ugewinnen heiBt also.
sich von der Well frei mach en odcr wcnig~ten \ ihre autonol11C Quelle. da'!'
transzendcntalc Ego. wiedcrfindcn . Dicse Entdeckung is! bek anntlich !laeh
Husser! nur durch die lranszendcntale Rcdultion moglich" ("Hu sser! und das
Problem der Frcihci(', in: H. N OAC K, cd .. HU.'iserl. DannM3ch. 1973. pp. 277-281.
here 281).
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